Friday, June 04, 2010
‘pseudo gang’—a state sponsored group used to advance an agenda, while discrediting the real opposition. General Frank Kitson, a British officer
first thought up the concept that was later used in the formation of Al Qaeda.
It was used in both Kenya and Northern Ireland. In Northern Ireland, most of the violence that was attributed to ‘Loyalists’ was in actuality not their handiwork, but the result of the activities of the death squads affiliated to the British secret state...
Rhodesians also used the “pseudo gang” to blame the violence on Patriotic Front guerrillas fighting for national determination against the racist government. Rhodesians had experience in counter-insurgency dating back to 1956 in Malaya which had included the Rhodesian African Rifles. They also modeled their ‘pseudo gangs’ after counter-insurgency strategy used in 1950s Mau Mau uprising in Kenya.
South Africa staged violent “black-on-black” to create the impression that ANC ‘terrorists’ were responsible, and police reports always blamed the ANC.”
South African police run strategic deception unit called Stratcom
“Jailed security police death-squad commander Colonel Eugene de Kock
admitted, Stratcom clandestine attacks on white people, to provoke a right-wing backlash
It is this sort of “backlash” the Anglo-American fake terror is designed to provoke against Muslims and Arabs. The neocon plan to wage a Thirty Years’ War, the “clash of civilizations” crew with the desire to expand their hold on
oil and resource rich Middle East and East Asia) and a faux schism between western and eastern civilization fits the ticket.
current round of dirty and murderous covert tricks carried out by moles and patsies under the guise of Islamic terrorism. Embedded experts are able to conceal their partisan roles behind the façade and legitimacy of academic status...
They reinforce US neoconservative propaganda. academic terrorism ‘experts’ – or terrorologists – are deeply embedded in the elite power structure. They
blur distinctions between political dissent, resistance to oppressive regimes, and violent threats to populations thus sanitising Western state.
terror as legitimate techniques for self-defence
In the 1960s and 1970s the ‘counter-insurgency school’ Richard Clutterbuck and Frank Kitson drew on their extensive experience in counter-insurgency campaigns, which set out to eradicate any resistance. They faced a sustained resistance which took the forms of both political and armed struggle.
They saw a ‘continuum of insurgency’ or ‘spectrum of political conflict’. popular protest, industrial action and terrorism were located on
points along a continuum of political violence.
In his book, Low Intensity Operations, Kitson (1971) argued that military forces must recognise that subversion and insurgency were now a part of ‘one total war’. Counter-insurgency theory provided a strategic framework for how a state should respond to insurgency, by treating political resistance as a military problem. According to Clutterbuck: ‘history has shown that terrorism can be and has been eliminated by a ruthless response to it, for power does ultimately lie with the government and its security forces’.
As Kevin Toolis has noted: ‘The counter-terrorist solution to revolt was always the same: military repression, assassinations, torture programmes and state-licensed killing squads’ (2004: 26).
infiltration of the local population can be achieved by covert operations, normally conducted by special forces
At the heart of this was the strategy of ‘turning.’ The method of acquiring and using agents was to spy on the guerrilla’s contacts with the people, identify who those were in touch with them, persuade a number of those to turn traitor, and so disrupt the rest of the organisation so that the guerrillas were fairly sure to go on relying on at least some of those people that would in the end betray them by giving ‘advance precise information’ (Clutterbuck, 1973: 212).
used to facilitate the further surrender of enemy personnel and the murders of those who allied themselves with the insurgents. Local populations who did not conform could be manipulated by, for example, cutting off their food supplies until they withdrew support for insurgent groups.
The British were notoriously brutal as does ‘low-intensity warfare’ today.
St Andrews-RAND nexus: redefining terrorism
Just as journalists are now ‘embedded’...