Wednesday, July 28, 2010
WikiLeaks offer no major revelations as did the Pentagon Papers
they increase the political pressure on a war policy by highlighting contradictions between the official assumptions of the strategy and the realities shown in the documents - especially in regard to Pakistan's role in the war.
Pentagon Papers chronicle the policymaking process leading up to the Vietnam War
WikiLeaks documents thousands of incidents that illustrate severe problems Among the themes
casual killing of civilians
night raids by special forces based on bad intelligence
absence of legal constraints on Afghan police
deeply rooted corruption among Afghan officials.
Pakistan's political and material support for the Taliban insurgency
There are many intelligence reports about Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, director of
(ISI) during the 1980s, and he is continuing to work with the Taliban commanders loyal to Mullah Omar as well as the Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar insurgent networks
reports reflect anti-Pakistan bias of the Afghan intelligence service under former Northern Alliance intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh. Nevertheless the impression is credible.
New York Times led with Pakistani-Taliban issue. It said the documents reflect "deep suspicions among American officials that Pakistan's military spy service has for years guided the Afghan insurgency with a hidden hand, even as Pakistan receives more than US$1 billion a year from Washington for its help combating the militants."
Pakistani "double-dealing" is administration's greatest political vulnerabilities, national security elite are worried about any hope for success.
Senator Russ Feingold, "highlight a fundamental strategic problem, which is that elements of the Pakistani security services have been complicit in the insurgency"
Hamid Karzai pointing to Pakistani sanctuaries as the primary problem
Last February, then director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair said: Disrupting the "safe havens" "won't be sufficient but it is a "necessary condition"
White House issued a compilation of statements showing that they had been tough with Pakistan But none admitted the reality: Pakistan's policy of supporting the Taliban insurgency firmly fixed and is not going to change
Admitting that Pakistan's fundamental interests in Afghanistan conflict with US war strategy would be a serious - and possibly fatal - blow to the credibility of the Obama administration's strategy of using force to "reverse the momentum" of the Taliban. this contradiction and others could accelerate the process that political support among the foreign policy and political elite continues to diminish. loss of this support has accelerated. prominent national security elite have signaled war strategy cannot succeed, paralleling 2006 in regard to the Iraq War