GARETH PORTER: LEAKS MAKE WAR POLICY VULNERABLE

WikiLeaks offer no major revelations as did the Pentagon Papers

they increase the political pressure on a war policy by highlighting contradictions between the official assumptions of the strategy and the realities shown in the documents - especially in regard to Pakistan's role in the war.

Pentagon Papers chronicle the policymaking process leading up to the Vietnam War

WikiLeaks documents thousands of incidents that illustrate severe problems Among the themes
casual killing of civilians
night raids by special forces based on bad intelligence
absence of legal constraints on Afghan police
deeply rooted corruption among Afghan officials.
Pakistan's political and material support for the Taliban insurgency

There are many intelligence reports about Lieutenant General Hamid Gul, director of
(ISI) during the 1980s, and he is continuing to work with the Taliban commanders loyal to Mullah Omar as well as the Jalaluddin and Sirajuddin Haqqani and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar insurgent networks

reports reflect anti-Pakistan bias of the Afghan intelligence service under former Northern Alliance intelligence chief Amrullah Saleh. Nevertheless the impression is credible.

New York Times led with Pakistani-Taliban issue. It said the documents reflect "deep suspicions among American officials that Pakistan's military spy service has for years guided the Afghan insurgency with a hidden hand, even as Pakistan receives more than US$1 billion a year from Washington for its help combating the militants."

Pakistani "double-dealing" is administration's greatest political vulnerabilities, national security elite are worried about any hope for success.

Senator Russ Feingold, "highlight a fundamental strategic problem, which is that elements of the Pakistani security services have been complicit in the insurgency"

Hamid Karzai pointing to Pakistani sanctuaries as the primary problem

Last February, then director of National Intelligence Dennis Blair said: Disrupting the "safe havens" "won't be sufficient but it is a "necessary condition"

White House issued a compilation of statements showing that they had been tough with Pakistan But none admitted the reality: Pakistan's policy of supporting the Taliban insurgency firmly fixed and is not going to change

Admitting that Pakistan's fundamental interests in Afghanistan conflict with US war strategy would be a serious - and possibly fatal - blow to the credibility of the Obama administration's strategy of using force to "reverse the momentum" of the Taliban. this contradiction and others could accelerate the process that political support among the foreign policy and political elite continues to diminish. loss of this support has accelerated. prominent national security elite have signaled war strategy cannot succeed, paralleling 2006 in regard to the Iraq War

ATOL: SAYED SALEEM SHAHZAD

Taliban leader Mullah Omar

Pakistan's army chief, General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani with close ties to the US

lines are clearly drawn between the militants and the military

Afghan Senator Arsala Rahmani is the main communication link to the Taliban. (ISI) had ask Rahmani to move to Peshawar, denounced Mullah Omar and formation of Jamiatul Khudamul Koran. This is the moderate Taliban, Pakistan sought to regain its influence in Afghanistan. The US came to accept the idea of "good" Taliban who could join President Hamid Karzai

earlier, Pakistan summoned Jalaluddin Haqqani and asked him to leave Mullah Omar. He was promised that with American support he would be appointed chief executive of Afghanistan. Haqqani's network has become one of the main drivers of the Taliban-led Afghan insurgency. Haqqani understood he would lose any authority and apologized saying that he could not leave Mullah Omar. ISI understood and never abandoned Haqqani.

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar and his Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA), gathered by the ISI and asked to open offices in Karachi, Peshawar and Quetta, the capital of Balochistan province. They were urged to go to Kabul and become involved. a few years ago HIA leader Qutubuddin Hilal went to Kabul to see President Hamid Karzai. Karzai welcomed the HIA delegation with respect, but American officials humiliated them and insisted that they should be condemned as terrorists.

Pakistan wanted a Pashtun-dominated, pro-Pakistan government in Kabul. US agreed to moderate Taliban. Rahmani, former Taliban foreign minister Abdul Wakeel Mutawakil welcomed in Kabul. HIA members were allowed to contest elections.

ISI launched the Jaishul Muslim, a militant organization aimed at fighting foreign occupation, but one that condemned Mullah Omar's support for al-Qaeda. This was a ploy to divide the Taliban. Several Taliban joined. At the same time, al-Qaeda was active. plans were undermined, Jaishul Muslim soon joined the Taliban.

Western agencies took this as a betrayal. By 2007, al-Qaeda had taken the insurgency
to Pakistan's cities and took over ISI's jihadi assets As a result, a battle was orchestrated between state forces and jihadi elements.

A key, in 2005 Kashmiri militants joined with al-Qaeda and the Taliban. In 2007, Ilyas Kashmiri and Sirajuddin Haqqani (Jalaluddin Haqqani's son) changed the dynamics of Taliban-led attacks. This opened a gap between Haqqani and Pakistan.

For instance, in 2009, Naseeruddin Haqqani, a brother of Sirajuddin Haqqani, was arrested by the Pakistan. Pakistani Taliban leader Baitullah Mehsud (now killed) secured his release by swapping some Pakistan army prisoners. Similarly, Sirajuddin Haqqani provided shelter to fleeing members of the Pakistani Taliban when the military began operations in the South Waziristan tribal area.

Pakistan has long-standing ties to the Taliban and militants, the country is on the brink of an unprecedented showdown with militants and their organizations.

In response, streams of militants are believed to be grouping in North Waziristan; Pakistan is at a critical juncture and a false move by it - or by its ally the US - could place it in the lap of extremist forces.

Mullah Omar
General Ashfaq Pervez Kiani

Senator Arsala Rahmani
Jamiatul Khudamul Koran

Jalaluddin Haqqani

Gulbuddin Hekmatyar
Hezb-e-Islami Afghanistan (HIA)
Qutubuddin Hilal

Abdul Wakeel Mutawakil

Jaishul Muslim

Ilyas Kashmiri
Sirajuddin Haqqani

Naseeruddin Haqqani
Baitullah Mehsud

NORTH EAST INDIA

source

Pakistan did not hesitate to jump in where the British left off in the post-partition period, and has since used its Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) agency to fund, train and arm these rebel groups in order to keep India’s hands tied. The largest and most powerful of the northeast secessionist movements is the United Liberation Front of Asom (ULFA). Once a student movement with populist aims to redistribute the state’s oil wealth, ULFA has gradually changed into what appears to be a moneymaking machine with a strong willingness to do the ISI’s bidding. ULFA runs an impressive extortion racket in the northeast, where Assam’s tea plantation owners and corporate leaders are regularly targeted.