Mr. Grillo describes how a people subjected to brutal violence, kidnapping, extortion, and systematic rape at the hands of organized criminals have come together and begun to do what the federal government is unable or unwilling to do. Grillo provides a brief history of the conflict and how it led to an armed confrontation between the autodefensas, the Cabelleros Templarios (Knights Templar Cartel), and the Mexican military. We also discuss broader issues of “narco culture,” media and the risk of sensationalism, prohibition, marijuana legalization, and the drug war economy.
HACE MUCHO TIEMPO QUE SE PROFETIZO QUE TU TONALI ERA CONOCER LA VERDAD ACERCA DE LAS COSAS DE ESTE MUNDO Y HACER CONOCER LA VERDAD - Chicóme-Xochitl Tliléctic Mixtli,
Showing posts with label cocaine. Show all posts
Showing posts with label cocaine. Show all posts
Monday, February 03, 2014
De-Manufacturing Consent- “Vigilante Justice in Mexico: Government Corruption, Inaction Revives a Movement”
http://www.boilingfrogspost.com/2014/02/03/de-manufacturing-consent-vigilante-justice-in-mexico-government-corruption-inaction-revives-a-movement-2/
Guillermo Jimenez Presents Ioan Grillo
On
this edition of De-Manufacturing Consent: Guillermo is joined by
investigative journalist and author of the book El Narco: Inside
Mexico’s Criminal Insurgency, Ioan Grillo. Guillermo and Ioan discuss
the ongoing struggle in Mexico with focus on the state of Michoacan and
the rise of “autodefensas” (civilian self-defense groups) that some have
compared to the Zapatista movement of the 1990s.
Mr. Grillo describes how a people subjected to brutal violence, kidnapping, extortion, and systematic rape at the hands of organized criminals have come together and begun to do what the federal government is unable or unwilling to do. Grillo provides a brief history of the conflict and how it led to an armed confrontation between the autodefensas, the Cabelleros Templarios (Knights Templar Cartel), and the Mexican military. We also discuss broader issues of “narco culture,” media and the risk of sensationalism, prohibition, marijuana legalization, and the drug war economy.
Mr. Grillo describes how a people subjected to brutal violence, kidnapping, extortion, and systematic rape at the hands of organized criminals have come together and begun to do what the federal government is unable or unwilling to do. Grillo provides a brief history of the conflict and how it led to an armed confrontation between the autodefensas, the Cabelleros Templarios (Knights Templar Cartel), and the Mexican military. We also discuss broader issues of “narco culture,” media and the risk of sensationalism, prohibition, marijuana legalization, and the drug war economy.
El Narco: Inside Mexico's Criminal Insurgency Paperback
http://www.amazon.com/El-Narco-Mexicos-Criminal-Insurgency/dp/1608194019
The world has watched, stunned, the bloodshed in Mexico. Forty thousand murdered since 2006; police chiefs shot within hours of taking office; mass graves comparable to those of civil wars; car bombs shattering storefronts; headless corpses heaped in town squares. And it is all because a few Americans are getting high. Or is it part of a worldwide shadow economy that threatens Mexico's democracy? The United States throws Black Hawk helicopters, DEA assistance, and lots of money at the problem. But in secret, Washington is at a loss. Who are these mysterious figures who threaten Mexico's democracy? What is El Narco?
El Narco is not a gang; it is a movement and an industry drawing in hundreds of thousands, from bullet-riddled barrios to marijuana-covered mountains. The conflict spawned by El Narco has given rise to paramilitary death squads battling from Guatemala to the Texas border (and sometimes beyond). In this "propulsive ... high-octane" book (Publishers Weekly), Ioan Grillo draws the first definitive portrait of Mexico's cartels and how they have radically transformed in the past decade.
The world has watched, stunned, the bloodshed in Mexico. Forty thousand murdered since 2006; police chiefs shot within hours of taking office; mass graves comparable to those of civil wars; car bombs shattering storefronts; headless corpses heaped in town squares. And it is all because a few Americans are getting high. Or is it part of a worldwide shadow economy that threatens Mexico's democracy? The United States throws Black Hawk helicopters, DEA assistance, and lots of money at the problem. But in secret, Washington is at a loss. Who are these mysterious figures who threaten Mexico's democracy? What is El Narco?
El Narco is not a gang; it is a movement and an industry drawing in hundreds of thousands, from bullet-riddled barrios to marijuana-covered mountains. The conflict spawned by El Narco has given rise to paramilitary death squads battling from Guatemala to the Texas border (and sometimes beyond). In this "propulsive ... high-octane" book (Publishers Weekly), Ioan Grillo draws the first definitive portrait of Mexico's cartels and how they have radically transformed in the past decade.
Saturday, December 05, 2009
EVO MORALES DELIVERS MAJOR SMACKDOWN TO OBAMA
Bolivia received a little diplomatic scolding from the Obama administration in September as a nation that had "failed demonstrably" in the global war on drugs. Bolivia joined a handful of other nations that did not receive a U.S. certification
The United States "doesn't have the authority or moral standing to question" Bolivia's battle against drug trafficking, an angry Bolivian President Evo Morales said at a press conference soon after the State Department smackdown.
Bolivian authorities have seized 19.4 tons of cocaine and coca paste so far in 2009, compared with 11 tons during all of 2005, the year before he took office.
He ridiculed the U.S. certification program as politicized theater, rewarding perceived friends and further distancing perceived enemies
Morales said the United States needs to focus on removing the plank from its own bloodshot eyes before seeking the speck in Bolivia's
posing a question that gets right to the contradiction at the heart of the U.S.'s 40-year transnational war on drugs: Why is there no parallel certification program for determining how well the United States is reducing its internal demand for illegal drugs?
"As long as there is a market for cocaine, however much we reduce coca leaf, part will always be diverted [to cocaine production]. That is our reality," Morales said. With 23 million users in the United States keeping the illegal drug trade growing, it's easy to see his point.
Morales proposes a coordinated regional anti-drug policy and suggested that the 12-member Union of South American Nations could start a certification program of its own to "certify or decertify the United States" based on how well it was confronting illegal drug demand within its borders.
We can keep bullying our neighbors in Latin America and maintain the charade that we are halting the opium trade in Afghanistan even as poppy processors there penetrate higher into the Karzai administration and funnel more money to the Taliban.
We can watch slackjawed as drug-fueled violence spills over our border from Mexico, and we can keep pumping cash into Colombia on the off-chance that stability will emerge, but as long as the United States continues to prosecute this endless and losing war of attrition, nothing will change.
Drug abuse is an illness, and treating it as a crime only propels this endless war and the destabilizing impact it has on countries the world over.
A nation that tolerates substance abuse such as smoking and drinking, which claims the lives of thousands each year, really needs to rethink its priorities and strategies in dealing with drugs like marijuana.
The people who are winning the war on drugs are
gangsters and the terrorists and the miscellaneous criminals and corrupt politicians who use the drug trade to enrich themselves or their death-dealing militancy. We need to outflank them. We need to medicalize, not militarize this war on drugs
The United States "doesn't have the authority or moral standing to question" Bolivia's battle against drug trafficking, an angry Bolivian President Evo Morales said at a press conference soon after the State Department smackdown.
Bolivian authorities have seized 19.4 tons of cocaine and coca paste so far in 2009, compared with 11 tons during all of 2005, the year before he took office.
He ridiculed the U.S. certification program as politicized theater, rewarding perceived friends and further distancing perceived enemies
Morales said the United States needs to focus on removing the plank from its own bloodshot eyes before seeking the speck in Bolivia's
posing a question that gets right to the contradiction at the heart of the U.S.'s 40-year transnational war on drugs: Why is there no parallel certification program for determining how well the United States is reducing its internal demand for illegal drugs?
"As long as there is a market for cocaine, however much we reduce coca leaf, part will always be diverted [to cocaine production]. That is our reality," Morales said. With 23 million users in the United States keeping the illegal drug trade growing, it's easy to see his point.
Morales proposes a coordinated regional anti-drug policy and suggested that the 12-member Union of South American Nations could start a certification program of its own to "certify or decertify the United States" based on how well it was confronting illegal drug demand within its borders.
We can keep bullying our neighbors in Latin America and maintain the charade that we are halting the opium trade in Afghanistan even as poppy processors there penetrate higher into the Karzai administration and funnel more money to the Taliban.
We can watch slackjawed as drug-fueled violence spills over our border from Mexico, and we can keep pumping cash into Colombia on the off-chance that stability will emerge, but as long as the United States continues to prosecute this endless and losing war of attrition, nothing will change.
Drug abuse is an illness, and treating it as a crime only propels this endless war and the destabilizing impact it has on countries the world over.
A nation that tolerates substance abuse such as smoking and drinking, which claims the lives of thousands each year, really needs to rethink its priorities and strategies in dealing with drugs like marijuana.
The people who are winning the war on drugs are
gangsters and the terrorists and the miscellaneous criminals and corrupt politicians who use the drug trade to enrich themselves or their death-dealing militancy. We need to outflank them. We need to medicalize, not militarize this war on drugs
Friday, December 04, 2009
COCAINE IS THE CENTRAL COMMODITY OF THE NEOLIBERAL AGE
About the Author
An historian and journalist, Forrest Hylton teaches Latin American politics and world history at the Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá), and is the author of Evil Hour in Colombia (Verso, 2006), among other books.
One of the defining policies of Cold War liberalism, President Johnson’s “War on Poverty”—which had less than one-tenth of the lifespan of the “War on Drugs”—took for granted that federal and state governments should take responsibility for improving the plight of the poor in northern cities, and represented a semi-coherent response to African American riots and insurgencies. But what if poor black people in cities could be held responsible for their poverty? What if, as industrial jobs disappeared by the millions, they became addicted to selling or consuming illegal drugs produced and/or distributed by U.S. government allies in Cold War counterinsurgent campaigns? Then, of course, African Americans could be locked up for non-violent drug offenses and warehoused in prisons at an accelerated rate.
“blame is at the heart of the War on Drugs.
politicians’ reactions to economic restructuring and the closure of many of America’s biggest factories in the 1970s and 80s, that the crack scare obviated the need to develop effective policies to tackle unemployment. As long as the focus stayed on drug sales and drug abuse, inner-city residents could be blamed for the poverty they had been driven into…what the politicians had to do was convince the American public that the inner cities deserved to be abandoned.”
The idea was to put African Americans back in their place without Jim Crow segregation, and to get elected or re-elected by doing it.
Nixon’s “War on Drugs,” Feiling notes, was “politically expedient, since it turned attention away from…Vietnam,
Whereas the U.S. had 200,000 prisoners in the 1970s, it currently has 1.8 million in jail and 5 million on probation or parole, making it the largest carceral state-society in world history
The U.S. accounts for 5 percent of the world’s population and 25 percent of its prison population. 500,000 people are serving time for non-violent drug offenses.
the profile of the U.S. prison population does not reflect consumption patterns: whites consume an estimated 80 percent of cocaine in the U.S., while African Americans consume 13 percent;
Yet 38 percent of those arrested and 59 percent of those convicted for drug offenses have been African Americans.
Were it not for the media, the law, policing, and prisons, the main feature of crack users would be their poverty and the misery of their de-industrialized urban surroundings, not their race.
After Ronald Reagan was elected, aerial fumigation was undertaken against marijuana growers in Mexico, Jamaica, and Colombia in the early 1980s, even as the Pacific Northwest became the leading supplier of the U.S. market thanks to its competitive advantage in transport costs;
“They” refers to drug barons, many of them large landowners as well as warlords, in Colombia, Mexico, Afghanistan, and Pakistan,
U.S. government allies in such countries—the intelligence services, the judicial systems, the military and police, business and political elites—are either complicit with or directly involved in supplying
in order to finance counter-insurgency wars.
The common thread is that the anti-communist end justified the means—active or passive collaboration with rightwing drug trafficking organizations in brutal counter-insurgency wars—in all places at all times.
In the neoliberal economy of the 1980s, anchored in financial services, insurance, real estate, and speculative asset bubbles, many African American males and immigrant males of color saw the cocaine-crack business as the way to achieve material security.
Latin American countries have now joined the Netherlands in treating drug consumption as a public health problem rather than a police problem.
In the U.S., however,
who wins and who loses from legalization. The losers, not necessarily in order of importance, would include U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the DEA, U.S. Border Patrol, the FBI, the ATF, the IRS, state and local police forces, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Armed Forces,
arms manufacturers like Sikorsky Helicopters; large pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer; suppliers of chemicals for fumigation like Monsanto; the banking sector as well as off-shore tax havens; the Republican Party; along with warlords, gangs, and gangsters
The clearest winners would be consumers, direct producers, and societies that would be less militarized, less carceral, less moralizing, and would have stronger public health and education systems.
“When you train your police to go to war, they’ve got to have an enemy.” Cole considers the War on Drugs a “terrible metaphor” for “policing in a democratic society.” Terrible, alas, but substitute “neoliberal” for “democratic” and it is nothing if not apt. Predictably, Obama and Kerlikowske have dropped the nomenclature, but the policies remain intact.
An historian and journalist, Forrest Hylton teaches Latin American politics and world history at the Universidad de los Andes (Bogotá), and is the author of Evil Hour in Colombia (Verso, 2006), among other books.
One of the defining policies of Cold War liberalism, President Johnson’s “War on Poverty”—which had less than one-tenth of the lifespan of the “War on Drugs”—took for granted that federal and state governments should take responsibility for improving the plight of the poor in northern cities, and represented a semi-coherent response to African American riots and insurgencies. But what if poor black people in cities could be held responsible for their poverty? What if, as industrial jobs disappeared by the millions, they became addicted to selling or consuming illegal drugs produced and/or distributed by U.S. government allies in Cold War counterinsurgent campaigns? Then, of course, African Americans could be locked up for non-violent drug offenses and warehoused in prisons at an accelerated rate.
“blame is at the heart of the War on Drugs.
politicians’ reactions to economic restructuring and the closure of many of America’s biggest factories in the 1970s and 80s, that the crack scare obviated the need to develop effective policies to tackle unemployment. As long as the focus stayed on drug sales and drug abuse, inner-city residents could be blamed for the poverty they had been driven into…what the politicians had to do was convince the American public that the inner cities deserved to be abandoned.”
The idea was to put African Americans back in their place without Jim Crow segregation, and to get elected or re-elected by doing it.
Nixon’s “War on Drugs,” Feiling notes, was “politically expedient, since it turned attention away from…Vietnam,
Whereas the U.S. had 200,000 prisoners in the 1970s, it currently has 1.8 million in jail and 5 million on probation or parole, making it the largest carceral state-society in world history
The U.S. accounts for 5 percent of the world’s population and 25 percent of its prison population. 500,000 people are serving time for non-violent drug offenses.
the profile of the U.S. prison population does not reflect consumption patterns: whites consume an estimated 80 percent of cocaine in the U.S., while African Americans consume 13 percent;
Yet 38 percent of those arrested and 59 percent of those convicted for drug offenses have been African Americans.
Were it not for the media, the law, policing, and prisons, the main feature of crack users would be their poverty and the misery of their de-industrialized urban surroundings, not their race.
After Ronald Reagan was elected, aerial fumigation was undertaken against marijuana growers in Mexico, Jamaica, and Colombia in the early 1980s, even as the Pacific Northwest became the leading supplier of the U.S. market thanks to its competitive advantage in transport costs;
“They” refers to drug barons, many of them large landowners as well as warlords, in Colombia, Mexico, Afghanistan, and Pakistan,
U.S. government allies in such countries—the intelligence services, the judicial systems, the military and police, business and political elites—are either complicit with or directly involved in supplying
in order to finance counter-insurgency wars.
The common thread is that the anti-communist end justified the means—active or passive collaboration with rightwing drug trafficking organizations in brutal counter-insurgency wars—in all places at all times.
In the neoliberal economy of the 1980s, anchored in financial services, insurance, real estate, and speculative asset bubbles, many African American males and immigrant males of color saw the cocaine-crack business as the way to achieve material security.
Latin American countries have now joined the Netherlands in treating drug consumption as a public health problem rather than a police problem.
In the U.S., however,
who wins and who loses from legalization. The losers, not necessarily in order of importance, would include U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement, the DEA, U.S. Border Patrol, the FBI, the ATF, the IRS, state and local police forces, the U.S. Coast Guard, the U.S. Armed Forces,
arms manufacturers like Sikorsky Helicopters; large pharmaceutical companies like Pfizer; suppliers of chemicals for fumigation like Monsanto; the banking sector as well as off-shore tax havens; the Republican Party; along with warlords, gangs, and gangsters
The clearest winners would be consumers, direct producers, and societies that would be less militarized, less carceral, less moralizing, and would have stronger public health and education systems.
“When you train your police to go to war, they’ve got to have an enemy.” Cole considers the War on Drugs a “terrible metaphor” for “policing in a democratic society.” Terrible, alas, but substitute “neoliberal” for “democratic” and it is nothing if not apt. Predictably, Obama and Kerlikowske have dropped the nomenclature, but the policies remain intact.
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